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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

J

Plainti f f-Respondent, i}

v.

\

RUDY RINGO DURAN,

1

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 870531-CA

i

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of Assault by a
Prisoner, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S
76-5-102.5 (1978), in the Third Judicial District Court. This
Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann.
S 78-2a-3(2)(f)(Supp. 1988).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the

jury'8 guilty verdict which rejected defendant's claim of defense
of self and habitation?
2.

Whether the trial court properly refused to reduce

the felony charge to a misdemeanor where two statutes proscribed
the same conduct but provided different penalties and the
statutes were not duplicative as to their elements?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-102.4 (1978).
Assault by a Prisoner — Any prisoner who
commits assault by intending to cause bodily
injury, is guilty of a felony of the third
degree•

Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-102.5 (1978).
Assault Against Peace Officer on Duty - Any
person who assaults a peace officer, with
knowledge he is on duty, is guilty of a Class
'A' Misdemeanor.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Rudy Ringo Duran, was charged with Assault
by a Prisoner, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. S 76-5-102.5 (1978).

Defendant was convicted as charged

after a jury trial held September 29 1987, through October 2,
1987, in the Third District Court, in and for Salt Lake County,
the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge, presiding.

Defendant was

sentenced by Judge Uno on November 2, 1987, to a term of zero to
five years in the Utah State Prison to be served consecutively
with Defendant's previous convictions.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the day of the assault, October 29, 1986, defendant
was an inmate at the Utah State Prison housed at cell-block "A"
#320 (T. 236, 304). On the previous day, while defendant was
locked in his cell, inmate John Neely assaulted Officer Norman
Carpenter (T. 234, 332). Defendant participated in the commotion
and excrement was found directly in front of his cell (T. 335,
341).
After inmate Neely was transferred to maximum security,
Officers Carpenter and Swanti patrolled "AM block to quiet the
inmates (T. 33). During this patrol, Officer Carpenter learned
that defendant had verbally threatened another inmate (T. 242).
Officer Carpenter wrote a report describing defendant's behavior
during the Neely assault and the verbal threat (T. 242).

Defendant was informed of the report and warned of the
possibility of being sent to maximum security for management
purposes (T. 243).
The next day, Lieutenant Walter Yankovich, reviewed
three separate reports written by Officers Carpenter, Swanti and
another officer concerning the defendant (T. 127-28).

The

reports indicated that defendant had attempted to incite other
inmates to assault Officer Carpenter by yelling, screaming,
throwing excrement, and verbally threatening another inmate (T.
105, 241-42).
To verify the reports, Lieutenant Yankovich talked to
Officer Swanti, who was on the shift with Officer Carpenter the
night of the Neely assault, and with Kevin Ritchens, an inmate
who was the lead of block "A" (T. 124-25).

Lieutenant Yankovich

then conferred by telephone with his superior, Captain Johnson
(T. 105). Together they determined that defendant should be
transferred to maximum security (T. 106).
Lieutenant Yankovich summoned Officers Olin and Uriate
to assist in transferring defendant to maximum security (T. 106).
Once at the cell, Lieutenant Yankovich instructed defendant to
dress and prepare to be transferred to maximum security (T. 106).
Defendant was informed he was being moved for management control
reasons (T. 106, 166, 181).
As Defendant finished dressing, he was instructed to
turn around and back up to the cell door to be handcuffed (T.
107, 166, 178, 182). Prison policy requires all prisoners to be
handcuffed while being transferred to a more restrictive facility
(T. 107, 180).

Defendant flatly refused to be handcuffed and informed
the officers that, "I'm not going to max." (T. 178, 180, 189).
Lieutenant Yankovich repeated the instruction that defendant turn
around to be handcuffed (T. 107, 166). Defendant defiantly
refused to follow the order and continued to stand in the center
of the cell with his arms folded across his chest (T. 108).
The officers then entered the cell and again instructed
defendant to turn around to be handcuffed (T. 166, 178, 182).
Defendant responded by assuming a combative stance in dropping
his arms to his side and spreading his legs slightly apart (T.
108, 140, 166, 183).
As Lieutenant Yankovich turned away from defendant to
get a pair of handcuffs from Officer Olin who was slightly behind
Yankovich, defendant struck Yankovich in the face (T. 108, 136,
167, 179, 183). Prior to the assault, Yankovich had neither
verbally nor physically threatened defendant (T. 109, 315).
The blow broke Lieutenant Yankovich's nose and blurred
his vision momentarily (T. 110, 137). Defendant again attempted
to assault the Lieutenant (T. 109, 137). However, three officers
were able to subdue defendant as he continued to resist (T. 109,
167, 183). Defendant was then handcuffed and transferred to
maximum security (T. 109). Defendant continued to struggle
against the officers en route to maximum security (T. 167, 168).
Lieutenant Yankovich's injury was treated at the Utah
State Prison Hospital (T. 100). The injury was diagnosed as a
large fracture to the nose (T. 110). Lieutenant Yankovich
received subsequent medical attention for a sore throat as a
«.«*»„i + rsf KinnH flowina down his throat (T. 110).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Sufficient evidence existed to support a conviction for
Assault by a Prisoner based upon the undisputed evidence that
defendant struck the prison guard without provocation.
Defendant's claim that he was being improperly transferred cannot
be considered a justification to commit a criminal assault.
While defendant is not precluded from asserting a civil rights
violation for an improper prison transfer, this criminal appeal
is not the proper avenue.

The jury could have reasonably

discounted defendant's self-defense claim because:

(1)

defendant's argument that a procedural violation licenses a right
to use force is erroneous; (2) defendant was the aggressor; or,
(3) in light of the circumstances, it was not reasonable for
defendant to believe he was in imminent danger of bodily harm.
The trial Court properly denied defendant's motion to
reduce the felony conviction to a misdemeanor charge where the
two statutes in question are not duplicative as to their
elements.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A
CONVICTION OF ASSAULT BY A PRISONER.
A. An Improper Prison Transfer Procedure Is
Not A Justification For Criminal Assault.
On appeal, defendant contends that he had a complete
defense to the assault charge.

He bases his claim on the unique

argument that he was justified in assaulting the prison guard
because the transfer to maximum security without a pre-transfer

hearing violated his federal and state due process rights.
Defendant's claim should be rejected because he improperly
asserts that an alleged civil due process violation is a legal
justification to commit a criminally violent act.
The central issue in this appeal is whether a criminal
assault occurred, and not, as defendant asserts, whether there
was an administrative procedural violation by prison authorities.
A review of the record demonstrates that there was sufficient
evidence to support a conviction of Assault by a Prisoner.
In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence to
support a jury verdict, it is well established that:
It is the exclusive function of the jury to
weigh the evidence and to determine the
credibility of the witnesses, and it is not
within the prerogative of this Court to
substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder. This Court should only interfere
when the evidence is so lacking and
insubstantial that reasonable men could not
possibly have reached a verdict beyond a
reasonable doubt.
State v. Lamm# 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980) (footnote omitted).
See also State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811 (Utah 1977); State v. Asay,
631 P.2d 861 (Utah 1981); State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah
1976); State v. Granatof 610 P.2d 1290 (Utah 1980); State v.
Fort, 572 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977); State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66
(Utah 1977); and State v. Erickson, 568 P.2d 750 (Utah 1977).
Moreover, "evidence is to be viewed in light most favorable to
the jury's verdict.-

State v. Gorlick, 605 P.2d 761 (Utah 1979).

In the case at bar, an examination of all the evidence
supports the conclusion that there was substantial evidence upon
which the trier of fact could have found defendant guilty of

assault.

It is undisputed that defendant struck Officer

Yankovich breaking the Officer's nose (T. 108, 307). The violent
act was unjustified as Officer Yankovich had made no verbal or
physical threats toward defendant (T. 109, 315). In fact, Officer
Yankovich had turned away from defendant when defendant struck
him (T. 108, 179). In viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict, and keeping in mind that in a
jury trial it is the jury's exclusive function to weigh the
evidence and determine the witnesses' credibility, sufficient
evidence existed to support a conviction of Assault by a
Prisoner.
Defendant attempts to divert the Court's attention from
the criminal assault to an alleged procedural violation by prison
authorities.

It is the State's position that if defendant has a

meritorious civil claim, defendant is not precluded from bringing
such an action against prison authorities. However, this criminal
appeal is not the proper avenue.

Thus, this Court should not

review defendant's civil due process claim.
A similar due process claim was asserted by prison
inmates in a civil rights action in Lavine v. Wright, 423 F.
Supp. 357 (D. Utah 1976).

In Lavine, Utah State Prison inmates

brought a civil action against prison administrators challenging
the exact Administrative Segregation Procedures asserted in this
case.

See also Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Montayne v.

Hayroes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976).

Defendant likewise had the legal

remedy of filing a civil rights action rather than resorting to
violence.

Additionally, defendant had the option to pursue a
civil claim through the prison Inmate Grievance Procedure (T.
317).

In fact, defendant took advantage of the grievance

procedure by filing a grievance against Officer Yankovich for
transferring him to maximum security (T. 319). It is significant
to note that the alleged procedural violation was subsequently
dismissed by the proper prison authorities (T. 320).
In sum, defendant had civil remedies available to
address any alleged civil rights violation resulting from the
prison transfer.

However, defendant's violent method of self-

help cannot be justified as a lawful remedy to alleged due
process violations,
B. The Jury Could Have Properly Rejected
Defendant'8 Claim Of Defense Of Self And
Habitation.
Defendant asserts that the jury's rejection of the
defenses of self-defense and habitation were erroneous and
unsupportable.

He argues that since the guards used greater

force than was necessary to accomplish an unlawful transfer, he
had the right to assault the prison guard to protect himself and
his habitation.
The central issue is whether under the facts of this
case defendant could properly invoke the affirmative defense of
self-defense.

Self-Defense is defined in Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-

402 (1978) as follows:
Force in defense of person—Forcible felony
defined.—(1) A person is justified in
threatening or using force against another
when and to the extent that he reasonably
believes that such force is necessary to
defend himself or a third person against such

other's imminent use of unlawful force;
however, a person is justified in using force
which is intended or likely to cause death or
serious bodily injury only if he reasonably
believes that the force is necessary to
prevent death or serious bodily injury to
himself or a third person, or to prevent the
commission of a forcibly felony.
(2) A person is not justified in using
force under the circumstances specified in
paragraph (1) of this section if he:
(a) Initially provokes the use of force
against himself with the intent to use force
as an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the
assailant; or
(b) Is attempting to commit, committing,
or fleeing after the commission or attempted
commission of a felony; or
(c) Was the aggressor or was engaged in a
combat by agreement, unless he withdraws from
the encounter and effectively communicates to
such other person his intent to do so and the
other notwithstanding continues or threatens
to continue the use of unlawful force.
(emphasis added).
Applying this statute, the jury had a number of grounds
upon which it could properly have rejected defendant's claim of
self-defense.
found that:

Among other things, the jury could reasonably have
(1) defendant was not justified in using force to

protect a constitutional right; (2) defendant was the aggressor;
or, (3) it was not reasonable for defendant to believe it was
necessary to use force to defend himself.
Defendant's claim that an administrative due process
violation is somehow a defense to an assault is completely
erroneous and without legal foundation.
not justify assaultive behavior.

Such a violation does

In State v. Wick, 331 N.W.2d

769 (Minn. 1983), the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the
argument that assaultive behavior is justified to protect a
constitutional right and upheld a conviction of assault.

The

defendant in Wick had assaulted a police officer because the
officer's search was more broad than defendant deemed necessary.
As to a defendant's rights in the face of a constitutional
violation, the Court stated that:
"while a defendant would have a right to
resist an officer in order to defend himself
or another against unjustified bodily attack,
assaultive conduct is not justified solely on
the ground that the officers are violating
the defendant's fourth amendment rights or on
the ground that the defendant believes that
the officers are violating his rights."
Id. at 771
The Illinois Appellate Court in People v. Taylor/ 112
111. App. 3d 3, 67 111. Dec. 677# 444 N.E.2d 1151 (1983) also
held assaultive behavior to be unjustified to preserve a
constitutional right.

In Taylor# the defendant contended that he

struck the officer because the officer was interfering with the
defendant's First Amendment right to free speech.

The Court

rejected this argument and found that a violation of a
constitutional right "did not constitute a defense to the charge
of battery."

Id. at 1152.

In the case at bar, defendant attempts to hide his
assaultive behavior behind the protective cloak of the
Constitution.

Defendant alleges that in assaulting the officer,

he was seeking to preserve the right to a pre-transfer hearing.
If this Court adopted defendant's reasoning, then chaos would
result as assaultive behavior would be a judicially condoned
method of remedying any alleged administrative procedural
violation.

Moreover, at trial, defendant testified that he was
willing to go to maximum security as long as he was not
handcuffed during the transfer (T. 307, 311-12, 314, 319).
Prison policy provides that all prisoners being transferred
within the prison be handcuffed during transfer (T. 107, 180).
Defendant testified that he was aware of the prison policy having
been handcuffed during previous transfers (T. 316).
In an attempt to comply with prison policy, Officer
Yankovich repeatedly instructed defendant to turn around to be
handcuffed (T. 166, 171, 314). Defendant verbally denounced the
order by telling the guards -that I refuse to be handcuffed." (T.
314).

As Officer Yankovich turned away from defendant to get the

handcuffs from another officer, defendant physically denounced
the order by striking Officer Yankovich (T. 108, 136, 167, 174,
183).

There was no discussion about a constitutional right to a

hearing, only a violent refusal on defendant's part to follow
prison policy (T. 108, 189). Defendant refused to be handcuffed,
so he struck the officer.
To accept defendant's claim is to permit violence as a
remedy for any perceived due process violation.

Defendant is

bankrupt for legal support justifying violence as a due process
remedy.

Therefore, this Court should find that the legality of

the transfer is not relevant to the assault charge.
Defendant attempts to support his self-defense claim by
analogizing the alleged unlawful transfer to be an unlawful
arrest.

He argues that since Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (Supp.

1988) infers a privilege to resist an unlawful arrest, defendant

had the right to resist the unlawful transfer.

While some states

do allow a person to resist an illegal arrest, this is a limited
privilege and courts refuse to condone assaultive behavior as a
reasonable means of resisting an illegal arrest.
For example, the Mississippi Supreme Court in Watkins
v. State, 350 So.2d 1384 (Miss. 1977) upheld a conviction of
aggravated assault on a police officer.

The Court determined

that even though the arrest violated the Fourth Amendment rights
of the defendant because it lacked probable cause, the existence
of the limited privilege to resist arrest did not authorize the
defendant to commit an assault.

The Mississippi Court reasoned

that -there is no judicial way that [defendant's] resistance can
be classified as privileged or condoned by a court in modern
society . . . Moreover, there would have been available to him
the legal processes of the courts for vindicating his illegal
arrest if indeed it was such." Jd. at 1387.
In State v. Harrell, 67 N.C. App. 57, 312 S.E.2d 230
(1984), the North Carolina Court of Appeals recognized the right
to reasonably resist an illegal arrest, but upheld a conviction
for an assault on a police officer.

The Court stated that Heven

if defendant had been illegally restrained under the fourth
amendment, he had the right to use only such force as reasonably
appeared necessary to prevent the unlawful restraint of his
liberty." Id., at 235.

In upholding the conviction, the court

interpreted defendant's act of striking the officer in the face
as an unnecessary show of force that fell outside of the limited
privilege of resisting an unlawful arrest. Id.

The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Bradshawf 541 P.2d
800 (Utah 1975) condoned an arrestee's degree of resistance in an
illegal arrest.

In Bradshaw, the defendant "offered no

interference whatever except to touch his fellow townsman, an
officer, and actually walked away from . . . the officer . . ."
Id., at 803 (Henriod, Chief Justice, concurring).

While the Utah

Supreme Court has not completely addressed what constitutes
reasonable behavior in resisting an illegal arrest, surely "an
arrestee is never justified in assaulting an arresting officer
unless the officer assaulted him first."

Brooks v. State, 144

Ga. App. 97, 240 S.E.2d 593 (1977).
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that defendant
assaulted the prison guard without provocation (R. 108-09, 307,
315).

Such unprovoked violent behavior cannot be judicially

condoned as falling within the limited privilege of resisting an
illegal arrest.

Further, the prison transfer should not be

considered an "arrest" where defendant had been committed to the
custody of the Department of Corrections and was simply being
transferred to a more restrictive environment.
In any event, the jury was instructed regarding
defendant's self-defense theory (R. 111-12, 114-19; Jury
Instruction No.'s 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30.)

They were

instructed that "if such evidence of self-defense when considered
in connection with all other evidence in this case raises a
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt or if it raises
reason to believe that the defendant acted in self-defense, you
must find him not guilty." (R. 119; Jury Instruction No. 30).

Upon deliberation, the jury rejected defendant's self-defense
claim and issued a verdict of guilty as charged (R. 165;
Verdict).

On appeal, this Court will not disturb a jury's

verdict unless the evidence is so "insubstantial or lacking that
reasonable individuals could not have reached a guilty verdict
beyond a reasonable doubt.-

State v. Warenski, No. 880293-CA,

slip op. at 2 (Utah Ct. App. December 19, 1988)(Per Curiam
Memorandum Decision Not for Publication)(citations omitted).

In

light of the undisputed evidence that defendant was the aggressor
not the defender, the jury could have reasonably rejected
defendant'8 theory of defense of self and habitation.
In State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88 (Utah 1981), the Utah
Supreme Court upheld a jury instruction which specified Hthat
self-defense is not a justification when the defendant is the
aggressor." ^d., at 90.

In reaching this decision, the Court

reasoned that "if the defendant were found to be the aggressor he
could not rely on the defense of self-defense. £d. at 91.

See

also State v. Robinson, 40 N.C. App. 514, 253 S.E.2d 311 (1979).
Under a similar analysis, the Maine Supreme Court in
State v. Millet, 273 A.2d 504 (Me. 1971) determined that because
the accused was the aggressor, the accused was not entitled to
any self-defense instructions.
-We are satisfied that in a day of
increasing resort to violence these are
salutary rules indeed. The law of selfdefense is designed to afford protection to
one who is beset by an aggressor and
confronted by a necessity not of his own
making. It must not be so perverted as to
justify [an assault] which occurs in the
course of a dispute provoked by the defendant
at a time when he knows or ought reasonably

to know that the encounter will result in . .
. combat . . . The law cannot give sanction
to the settling of disputes by the use of
[force]."
Id. at 510.
In the case at bar, the theory of self-defense is not
appropriate where defendant initiated the violence.

Therefore,

he cannot now claim that his actions were in self-defense.

As

the Oklahoma Supreme Court said, H[o]ne who seeks and brings on
an affray cannot shield himself under the plea of self-defense."
Jenkins v. State, 161 P.2d 90, 96 (Okla. 1945).

See also People

v. Schliesser, 671 P.2d 993 (Colo. App. 1983).
Defendant asserts that while he may have been the
aggressor, it was reasonable for him to believe that he needed to
defend himself by force against the unlawful force of the prison
guards.

He argues that although the prison guards did not

verbally or physically threaten him, the mere presence of three
guards in his cell constituted a greater force than necessary to
transfer a prisoner (T. 315, 318). Thus, defendant interpreted
their presence as a threat "that they were going to assault me.M
(T. 308, 318-19).

Defendant's claim should be dismissed because

his subjective fears without more is not enough to support a
claim of self-defense.
The test for self-defense is both subjective and
objective:

the individual must believe that he is in imminent

danger and such a belief roust be reasonable.

"A subjective fear

does not by itself entitle the defendant to use self-defense."
Tatman v. Cordinglyf 672 P.2d 1286, 1290 (Wyo. 1983). According
to Prosser:

"The privilege to act in self-defense
arises, not only where there is a real
danger, but also where there is a reasonable
belief that it exists.
The belief must, however, be one which a
reasonable roan would have entertained under
the circumstances . . . [I]t is not enough
that he really believes that he is about to
be attacked, unless he has some reasonable
ground for the belief . . ."
Prosser, Torts, S 19 p. 109 (4th ed. 1971).
In applying this objective standard, the Utah Supreme
Court in State v. Maestasf 564 P.2d 1386 (Utah 1977) affirmed a
conviction of an assault by a prisoner. In Maestas, the
defendant's self-defense claim was based on the idea that the
prison environment made defendant more fearful of his personal
safety, having been stabbed in a previous prison brawl. Id. at
1387.

In upholding the conviction, the Court discounted

defendant's subjective fears because there was no reasonable
substantial evidence to support defendant's self-defense theory.
See also Bennett v. Brandrud Manufacturing Co., 1 Wash. App. 183,
459 P.2d 977 (1969).
In a case almost identical to the case at bar, the Utah
Supreme Court in State v. Dock, 585 P.2d 56 (Utah 1978) refused
to reverse a conviction of assault by a prisoner.

In this case,

as two prison guards entered the defendant's cell to transport
him to maximum security, the defendant assaulted one of the
guards.

The defendant based his self-defense claim on the idea

that "he was afraid when the guards came to transfer him to
maximum security.- Ici. at 57. The Utah Supreme Court rejected
defendant'8 fears as unreasonable under the circumstances as "no
evidence was presented showing the entrance into the defendant's
j % 11
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v i o l e n t . " Id.

Likewise, in the case at bar, no evidence was presented
showing the entrance into defendant's cell was unlawful or
violent.

In fact, the guards only entered the cell after

defendant repeatedly refused to back up to the jail bars and be
handcuffed as instructed (T. 166, 178). The basis of defendant's
fear was that the mere presence of three guards in his cell
presented a threat that he would be beaten (T. 315, 318-19).
Defendant's fear was completely subjective and not objectively
reasonable in view of the lack of aggression on the part of the
guards.

Since, defendant's subjective fear without more is not

enough to support a claim of self-defense, the jury could have
properly discounted defendant's self-defense claim.
Defendant argues that his fear was reasonable because
on the day prior to the assault Officer Carpenter threatened to
send defendant to maximum security (T. 243). However, since
Carpenter's threat to send defendant to maximum security was not
accompanied by any threat of violence to defendant, it was not
reasonable for defendant to believe he was in imminent harm when
the prison guards attempted to transfer him to maximum security.
The jury also properly rejected defendant's claim of
defense of habitation.

The United States Supreme Court held in

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) that a prisoner has "no
expectation of privacy- in his cell.

Id. at 526. Because

defendant had no privacy interest in his cell, his habitation
defense is meritless.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO REDUCE THE FELONY CHARGE TO A
MISDEMEANOR.
Defendant contends that he was unlawfully charged and
convicted.

He argues that since he could have been charged under

two different statutes which proscribe identical conduct, but
impose different penalties, the trial court erred when it refused
to reduce the felony charge to a misdemeanor.
Defendant was charged and convicted of Assault by a
Prisoner, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
S 76-5-102.5 (1978) which provides:
Assault by a Prisoner — Any prisoner who
commits assault by intending to cause bodily
injury, is guilty of a felony of the third
degree.
The crime of Assault Against Peace Officer on Duty, a class "A"
misdemeanor, is defined as follows:
Any person who assaults a peace officer, with
knowledge he is on duty, is guilty of a Class
'A' Misdemeanor.
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102.4 (1978).
In support of his claim, defendant relies on State v.
Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (1969) in which the Utah
Supreme Court held that where two statutes proscribe the same
behavior, but impose different penalties, the defendant is
entitled to the lesser penalty.

However, the application of

Shondel is limited to situations where the statutes at issue are
-wholly duplicative as to the elements of the crime." State v.
Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 263 (Utah 1985); See also State v. Gomez,
722 P.2d 747, 749 (Utah 1986).

Applying this limited standard, the Utah Supreme Court
in State v. Halesf 652 P.2d 1290 (Utah 1982) refused to reduce a
felony conviction of Willfully Destroying Public Records by a
Custodian.

In Hales, the defendant could have been charged under

the more general misdemeanor charge of Tampering with Records
which applied to -any person.-

In denying the reduction of the

conviction, the court reasoned that while the conduct prohibited
might be the same, the statutes were distinct in that they
applied to different people.

The court found that such a

distinction was -manifestly rational- because -[p]ublic officials
have greater access to public records and, by virtue of the
public trust reposed in them, a higher responsibility to
safeguard the interests and property of the public than do other
members of the community.-

Id. at 1293.

In the case at bar, the statutes at issue can be
distinguished on the same point.

The crime of Assault by a

Prisoner applies to -any prisoner- whereas the crime of Assault
Against Peace Officer on Duty applies to "any person.-

Thus,

Legislature has determined that the act of a prisoner committing
an assault should be punished more severely than an assault
committed by other members of the community.

Given the dangerous

and highly volatile environment of prison life, such a
distinction is -manifestly rational.-

Hales, 652 P.2d at 1293.

Additionally, the victims of the respective crimes are
not identical.

Assault by a Prisoner applies to violent acts

against any person, not just police officers. Accordingly, a
prisoner may be charged with Assault by a Prisoner by attacking

another inmate.

In contrast, Assault Against Peace Officer on

Duty# by its own definition# applies only to attacks on law
enforcement individuals, not the public generally.
It is well-established that the Legislature has the
authority to determine the degree of punishment for specific
crimes.

As the Utah Supreme Court stated in State v. Clark, 632

P.2d 841, 843-44 (Utah 1981):
It is not unconstitutional for a state to
impose a more severe penalty for a particular
type of crime than the penalty which is
imposed with respect to the general category
of crimes to which the special crime is
related or of which it is a subcategory . . .
As long as the legislative classifications
are not arbitrary, the fact that conduct may
violate both a general and a specific
provision of the criminal laws does not
render the legislation unconstitutional, even
though one violation is subject to a greater
sentence.
Id.
The comparative statutes at issue are clearly
distinguishable in that they define dissimilar actors and
victims.

Because of the unique nature of prison life and the

need for hightened deterrence, such a distinction cannot be
classified as "arbitrary."

Therefore, the prosecutor acted

within his prosecutorial discretion when he charged defendant
with a violation of a statute that "applies more specifically to
the [defendant's] offense . . . "

Rammell v. Smith, 560 P.2d

1108, 1110 (Utah 1977).
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, respondent
respectfully requests this Court to affirm defendant's
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